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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY 0. BAYLES, ; 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ] 
Respondent/Appellee. ) 
) Appeals Case No. 20070334 
Second District Court No. 004702059 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h), and pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1. Petitioner/Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence against the 
trial court's findings of fact 
Issue 2. The trial court was not attempting to interpret California Residential 
Purchase Agreements but was determining Respondent's obligation to Petitioner when he 
exercised his right of first refusal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refiised 
1 
to order specific performance. 
Issue 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that each 
party continue to pay a portion of the cost for the survivor benefit, but awarded Mr. Bayles 
a parcel of property as an offset for the expense of the survivor benefit. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In order to overturn the District Court's findings of fact, the appellant must "marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct App. 1991) 
(citations omitted). 
The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912. " 'A trial court has considerable discretion considering 
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.' 
We will disturb the trial court's division only if there is a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law such that a manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion. 
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, % 16, 147 P.2d 464, quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 
UT App 83,1fl7, 45 P.3d 176. 
"Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in adjusting the financial interests 
2 
of parties to divorce and modification proceedings, so long as the decision is within the 
confines of 'legal precedence....1! VI it in »i luiiil u imi ill IIIII^  ixcicisi1 Inoad ilisuilioiii i'i 
presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of .discretion'." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), quoting Hansen v. Hansen < 30 (utar . f . h 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) states: "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable r^Hers ^eh^r *~ the ^ndren, property, debts or 
obligations, .i I it I  | will us •-• Vt •* • continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary I""" (I miphasis added. I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal follows a trial held on July 3, 2006 and July 5, 2006, before the 
Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, on Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree 
o • orce and on isstit s a ililii dil hoin di (fiiium III tiimi on iiiiii I hilli. i lo Show I 'nisi tin 
Petitioner/Appellant objects to the provisions of the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce concerning allocation of 
payment for Respondent's survivor bench I m Pctilionci 'siehieinenl, »(H sale oi disposition 
of one remaining parcel of marital property located in the State of California, and regarding 
3 
the obligations of the parties in connection with the sale of marital properties of the parties 
located in the State of California. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced following a trial on October 1-2, 2002. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce, were entered on November 25, 
2002. (Record on Appeal, pages 148 gt seq. and pages 167 et seq.) (See copies in the 
Addendum). 
2. At the time of the divorce, the parties owned multiple parcels of property 
in Yuba County, California. The Court found in f 24 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law: "In light of the parties' past payment and debt history, the above-mentioned 
California properties should be sold as soon as possible." (Record on Appeal, page 153). 
3. The Court further found in % 15 of its Decree of Divorce: 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal for the purchase of any 
and all of the California properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer 
to purchase a California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of 
the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of 
said notice to provide written notice of his election to purchase the property 
on the same terms as the bona fide offer. If petitioner exercises the right of 
first refusal, he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from 
the sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
4. Subsequent to the divorce, an evidentiary hearing was held on November 
10,2004, and Petitioner appealed from the Order entered after that hearing. In case number 
20041133, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the District Court. 
5. The case came before the District Court again on July 3,2006 and July 5, 
4 
2006 as a post-divorce proceeding to modify the decree of divorce and to resolve issues 
certified from a hearing ii11 in (Jul* i In Shin t I .muse. 
6. At the time of trial in 2006, Petitioner was under an order to pay alimony 
to Respondent, but he had not paid alimony since May, 2005 (almost one year after he filed 
y s pefition i0 modify). (Finding of Fact f8 nl Rvan d on Appeal page -143, Transcript o I 
July 3 & 5, 2006 page 296, lines 21-23). 
7 The Court found that despite receiving no alimony since May, 2005, 
Respondent had been able to 'hold her own from May, 2005 through the date of trial, July 
3, 2006 (Finding of Fact | 8 at Record on Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 
2006 page 296, line 25 through page 297, line 10). 
8. The Court found that Petitioner no longer had the ability to pay alimony; 
e yen if the Respondent needed alimony, Petitioner could nol piiy alimony (Finding of Fncl 
%9 at Record on Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 297, line 14-21; 
page 129, line 22 through page 130, line 24; page 185, lines 22-24; page 186, line 15 through 
page 18 1 ' , ougli pi i. lage 241 line 23 through |>ug< 
242, line 7). 
9. Petitioner retired from the IRS on a medical disability after the trial of the 
by the Court in the Decree of Divorce. Respondent receives twenty-one per cent. (21%) of 
Petitioner's retirement benefit as her Woodward share. (Decree of Divorce f25, page 173 
of record on appeal; transcript of trial July j<K3, 2006 page 26, lines 10 through page 27, 
5 
line 8; page 28, line 13-16). 
10. In the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner was ordered to elect a full survivor 
benefit for his retirement pending further order of the Court. Decree of Divorce f 26 (page 
173 of record on appeal) 
11. At the time of divorce, the Court reserved for future determination the 
amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the Respondent and the issue of which party 
should pay the monthly cost for the survivor benefits. (Decree of Divorce f26, page 173 of 
record on appeal). 
12. The monthly cost of Respondent's survivor benefits is approximately 
$272.00 per month. The cost of the survivor benefit is deducted from the retirement before 
it is divided pursuant to the Woodward formula, and before either party is paid their share 
of the retirement. Respondent pays a proportion of the cost of the survivor benefit by virtue 
of a proportional reduction of her Woodward share of the retirement benefit. The court 
ordered that the survivor benefit be paid as it has since Petitioner's retirement, and did not 
adjust the allocation of the cost of the survivor benefit. (Finding of Fact f 11 at Record on 
Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 30, lines 11-12; page 34, lines 3-
18; page 109, lines 1-4; page 197, lines 17-22; page 254, lines 14-16, page 276, line 2 
through page 277, line 16). 
13. In the Decree of Divorce, the parties were ordered to sell all parcels of 
property in California, and divide the proceeds; and each party was given a right of first 
refusal to purchase any of the properties. At the time of trial on the modification 
6 
proceeding, one parcel of California property remained, which the parties referred to as the 
"five-acre parcel". (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 85, lines 11-19). 
14. The property taxes on the five-acre parcel were delinquent. (Transcript 
of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 64, lines 4-7; page 65, line 21 through page 66, line 4; page 
161, lines 3-6), 
15. The parties had received offers to purchase the five-acre parcel, but the 
property had never been sold. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 85, line 21 et seq.; 
page 91, line 1 through page 92, line 92; page 96, lines 2-22). 
16. The Court awarded the remaining California property, the five-acre parcel, 
to Respondent as an offset for the allocation of the cost of the survivor benefit, to provide 
him a source of funds from which to pay the survivor benefit (or to recoup the cost he pays 
for the survivor benefit). Based on the estimated value of the five acre parcel and the cost 
of the survivor benefit, if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the cost of the survivor benefit to 
Petitioner should approximate the value of the five-acre parcel. (Finding of Fact f^ 12 at 
Record on Appeal page 444-445 ; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 97, lines 11-12; 
page 150, lines 5-20; page 165, lines 14-19; page 198, line 18 through page 199, line 2, lines 
20-22, page 234, line 11-15; page 242, lines 1-11). 
17. Respondent accepted offers to purchase several of the California parcels 
from third parties; those offers included standard terms and conditions for sales to third 
parties, including a requirement for a grant deed and title insurance. Respondent would have 
been obligated to pay a real estate commission to her realtor if those sales to third parties had 
7 
been consummated. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 74, lines 7-8; page 75, lines 
13-18; page 76, lines 7-11; page 89, line 18 through page 90, line 8;). 
18. Petitioner exercised his right of first refusal to purchase three parcels of 
property owned by the parties. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5,2006 page 74, lines 1-9; page 
75, lines 13-20; page 76, lines 7-13). 
19. Petitioner tendered payment to Respondent for her interest in each parcel. 
Respondent did not comply with all terms of the sales contracts entered with third party 
buyers when she accepted Petitioner's payment for his exercise of the right of first refusal. 
Only after tendering payment, Petitioner demanded that Respondent comply with all terms 
of the sales contracts as those contracts were written with third parties. Petitioner did not 
put Respondent on notice of his intention to require her to comply with all terms of the sales 
contracts until after he tendered his payments. Having failed to put Respondent on notice 
to perform all the terms of the contracts, Petitioner waived his right to demand performance 
and the Court refused to order Respondent to perform all the terms of the contracts. 
Respondent's only obligation was to provide Petitioner with a deed of the same quality with 
which the parties obtained title to the property; i.e., if the parties held title by a grant deed, 
Respondent should provide Petitioner with a grant deed, and if they held title by a quit claim 
deed, Respondent should provide Petitioner with a quit claim deed. Petitioner was not 
entitled to get better title than he had before purchasing the interest of Respondent in the 
property. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 104, line 13 through Page 107, line 7; 
page 141, line 2 through page 142, line 8; page 144, lines 9-25; page 245, line 2 through page 
8 
146, line 18; page 201, line 12 through page 203, line 18; page 204, lines 10-24; page 207, 
lines 14-25; page 208, lines 1-15; page 228, line 17 through page 229, line 12). 
20. The trial court found that the terms of the sales contracts were more of a 
technicality than what the bargain was, and refused to order Respondent to comply 
specifically with the terms of the sales contracts. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5,2006 page 
230, lines 3-21; page 259, lines 13-19; page 263,lines 17-23). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Petitioner/Appellant has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support 
of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, die trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 
'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991). He has failed to 
meet this burden, and thus the Court must assume that the findings of fact of the trial court 
are supported by the record. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Respondent did not 
have to comply with the terms of sales contracts other than providing Petitioner with an 
appropriate deed, and refusing to find Respondent in contempt for not complying with all 
terms contained in the sales of the various California parcels. 
3. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter one order in 
which the court terminated alimony, ordered that there would be no change in the payment 
of the cost of the survivor benefit for Respondent on Petitioner's retirement, and as an offset 
to the amount Petitioner is ordered to pay for the retirement, awarded Petitioner the entire 
9 
five-acre parcel of California property. This financial package must be looked at in its 
entirety, and in its entirety it is equitable. This order carried out the trial court's intention 
to equally divide between the parties the value of the marital properties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER/APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
The Petitioner/Appellant fails to meet the standard of appellate review to overturn the 
trial court's decision. He has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Mr. Bayles has not, in "comprehensive and fastidious order, [marshaled] every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." 
Moon v. Moon, 973 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999) Instead of meeting his burden, Mr. 
Bayles simply states the facts as he wanted them to be. In cases such as this, the Court has 
stated that it will" . . .[assume] that the record supports the findings of the trial court and 
[this Court] proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law to the case." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,432 (Utah App. 
1994). Even if Mr. Bayles had met the first prong of marshalling the evidence, he has 
failed to met the second prong, which calls for an analysis to expose any "fatal flaw in the 
evidence" sufficient to overturn the trial court's findings. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437. 
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Since Mr. Bayles has not met his burden, this court should find the trial court's 
findings are supported by the record. 
n. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO INTERPRET 
CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE AGREEMENTS BUT WAS 
DETERMINING RESPONDENT'S OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER 
WHEN HE EXERCISED HIS RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. THE COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The Petitioner is attempting to raise again the issues raised, at least in part, and 
determined, in the prior appeal of this case concerning Respondent's obligations to Petitioner 
in connection with Petitioner's exercise of a right of first refusal to purchase Respondent's 
interest in certain marital properties located in California. To the extent those issues are 
raised again here, they are res judicata. 
The trial court was not asked to interpret California Residential Purchase 
Agreements, nor did the Court do so. The Court was asked to determine whether 
Respondent should be required to provide additional services or benefits to Petitioner after 
he exercised his right of first refusal to purchase Respondent's interest in certain marital 
properties located in California, after tendering his payment to Respondent for her interest. 
In essence, the Court was asked to interpret its own intention as embodied in 
the Decree of Divorce concerning the respective rights and duties of the parties. Mr. Bayles 
argues that there was a contract between himself and Mrs. Bayles for each parcel of property 
when he exercised his right of first refusal and purchased her interest in those properties. No 
evidence was presented to the trial court that would create any contract between Mr. Bayles 
11 
and Mrs. Bayles concerning those properties, and no evidence is cited by Mr. Bayles other 
than the existence of certain contracts with third parties for the purchase of those marital 
properties. 
The trial court made a specific finding that "if Petitioner wished to have 
Respondent comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner should have done 
them prior to the time he sent payment." The court further found that "Petitioner did not 
demand compliance with the terms of the sales contracts until after payment had been made." 
Finding of Fact f 13, Record on Appeal page 445. As Mr. Bayles has failed to marshal the 
evidence against these findings, they are deemed to be supported by the record; further, his 
own statement of facts in his brief acknowledges that he did not demand compliance prior 
to making payment. 
Even if Mr. Bayles was entitled, under equity and under the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce, to insist that Mrs. Bayles perform all terms of the sales contracts with 
third parties when he purchased her interest, he waived his right to demand compliance with 
all those terms. In Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), the seller (defendant 
in that case) was found to have waived strict compliance with the terms of the contract 
concerning time of payment, and specific performance was ordered. In the case at hand, Mr. 
Bayles waived any right to demand strict compliance (if he even had the right to demand 
strict compliance with the third-party contract) by tendering payment before demanding 
compliance. He has received title to the properties, and Mrs. Bayles has received her 
payment; each party has received the benefit contemplated by the Decree of Divorce. This 
12 
results in an equitable division of marital properties which lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and which division should not be disturbed on appeal. 
ffl. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ORDERED THAT EACH PARTY CONTINUE TO PAY A PORTION 
OF THE COST FOR THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT BUT AWARDED MR. BAYLES 
A PARCEL OF PROPERTY AS AN OFFSET 
FOR THE EXPENSE OF THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT. 
To the extent that Mr. Bayles' brief seems to challenge the underlying division 
of retirement in this case, it is untimely, as that initial division was made in the original 
Decree of Divorce and was never challenged. The issue which was actually tried before the 
trial court concerning retirement, and the only issue concerning retirement which can be 
considered here, is the allocation of the monthly cost to maintain a survivor benefit for 
Respondent. This brief addresses that issue. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter one unified order 
in which the court terminated alimony; ordered that there would be no change in the payment 
of the cost of the survivor benefit for Respondent on Petitioner's retirement; and as an offset 
to the amount Petitioner is ordered to pay for the retirement, awarded Petitioner the entire 
five-acre parcel of California properly. The court crafted a composite solution to resolve 
several outstanding issues, and the court's order must be looked at as a whole, without 
isolating one or two items. Petitioner asks the court to strike down one part of this package, 
without addressing the five-acre parcel of property which was clearly awarded to Petitioner 
as an offset (emphasis added). While the trial court did not relieve Petitioner of the 
13 
responsibility to pay some (not all) of the cost of the survivor benefit which clearly will only 
benefit Respondent, the trial court gave Petitioner an asset with an estimated value of 
$30,000. Petitioner has the ability to immediately sell that property and use the proceeds 
however he chooses; this includes $15,000 which otherwise would have belonged to 
Respondent based on the Decree of Divorce ordering the parties to share equally the 
proceeds of the properties. The testimony clearly showed that Respondent was in need of 
the survivor benefit, but had no ability to pay directly for the survivor benefit. 
Utah case law clearly favors an avoidance of continuing joint ownership in 
marital assets whenever possible. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); 
Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). This case is a prime example of the 
wisdom of this policy, but not, as Mr. Bayles suggests, concerning the retirement. Rather, 
it is the California real estate which has generated the most problems between the parties. 
Therefore, an approach which allocates, once and for all, the final remaining California 
parcel, which remained unsold almost four years after the divorce became final, was not only 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, but a wise move to avoid future entanglements 
and disputes between the parties. As in Parker, the trial court's "disposition concerning this 
asset properly disentangled the (parties) from future acrimonious business involvement." 
996 p.2d 565,570,1(19. 
Further, despite Mr. Bayles' assertion to the contrary, this case exactly fits into 
the Woodward mold. Mr. Bayles' retirement benefit is not a liquidated fund; "...where no 
present value can be established and the parties are unable to reach agreement, resort must 
14 
be had to a deferred distribution based upon fixed percentages." 656 P.2d 431, 433. That 
fixed percentage has also applied in this case to the amount each party pays for Respondent's 
survivor benefit, due to the way the cost is calculated and paid. The case of Motes v. Motes, 
786 P.2d 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is apropos, as Mr. Motes was already retired at the time 
the decree of divorce was entered, and he was receiving monthly retirement benefits. As the 
Court stated in Motes, "Treatment of such benefits is less problematic than in the usual case. 
The present value of plaintiff's share of the now-fixed stream of income, which the benefits 
have become, can be readily calculated and compensated for with distribution of other assets 
having an equivalent value or cashed out over a comparatively short time. That failing, 
provision can simply be made for plaintiff to receive her share monthly...." Id, 786 P.2d 232, 
234. Mrs. Bayles currently receives her share of the retirement stream of income monthly; 
she also pays a proportionate share of the cost for her survivor benefit monthly, which 
reduces her share of the monthly retirement stream. The Court exercised sound discretion 
in using another asset (the five-acre parcel) to compensate Mr. Bayles for the amount he pays 
monthly for the cost of the survivor benefit. 
This case raises an issue previously addressed in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In that case, Mrs. Burt also sought a share of the survivor annuity 
benefit incident to Mr. Burt's government retirement benefit. At footnote 8, the court stated 
that "while a present settlement is preferable, the trial court may award the defendant a share 
of the income stream from the retirement benefits as they are paid, not in the form of alimony 
but as a property award not terminable upon remarriage." The cost for the survivor annuity 
15 
benefit was treated in a similar fashion, "fixing a present value and considering that sum in 
the distribution scheme, or awarding the defendant an interest in the annuity to protect her 
right to continued payment of the retirement income." 799 P.2d 1166, 1171. In the instant 
case, the trial court considered the present value of die future cost to preserve the survivor 
annuity benefit, and considered that present value in awarding Mr. Bayles the five-acre 
parcel of property but ordering that he continue to bear the burden of 79% of the cost of the 
survivor benefit. 
The trial court in this case, in the sound exercise of its discretion, fashioned 
an equitable solution which not only resolved the issue of the continuing payment for the 
survivor benefit, but also once and for all removed as a bone of contention between the 
parties the final parcel of California property which remained unsold. The total award is not 
an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bayles has failed in his initial burden of marshalling the evidence in 
support of the findings of the trial Court, and therefore the Court on appeal should not reach 
the merits of his case. However, to the extent that he had the right to demand that Mrs. 
Bayles comply with the terms of contracts entered into with third parties, he waived the right 
to demand compliance when he tendered payment before making such demands. The trial 
court admirably met its burden of equitably dividing the marital properties of the parties 
when it preserved the existing payment structure for the cost of Mrs. Bayles' survivor 
benefit, but awarded Mr. Bayles the five-acre parcel as an offset to cost he pays. The 
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allocation of payment for the survivor benefit cannot be considered in a vacuum, but only 
in context of the entire order, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering that 
order. The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce should be affirmed. 
DATED this<2_ day of _ 2007. 
JUD^ 
AttomeV/or ti^Respondent- Appellee 
Linda <2aryl Bayles 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the y day of October, 2007,1 served 
a copy of the attached Brief of the Respondent/Appellee upon Wesley O. Bayles, 
Petitioner/Appellant pro se in this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Wesley O. Bayles 
P.O. Box 357 
Forbestown, CA 95941 
G 
Respondent/Appellee 
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E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340) 
WEEKS LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1050 Walker Terrace 
19 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2800 
V 25 2002 
tayton District Court 
Divorce Decree 
VD10820269 004702059
 B A Y L E S LINDA CAF cD 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
VS, 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002. The Court, having 
reviewed the documents~"and"~pleadings on file herein, having heard 
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the 
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
3 . The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support 
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna 
Rosa Flores Salazar. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner shall 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier 
recommendation. The check has already been delivered to the 
respondent as satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner 
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank 
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
7. The petitioner is required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone/account. 
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner 
subject to the debt thereon. The respondent shall execute a 
quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents 
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence. 
10. The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful 
Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest 
therein. The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit 
or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof. 
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking 
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the 
sale and transfer of the Residence. 
11. The respondent is not responsible for payment of 
the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the 
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation 
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001. 
12. The parties jointly hold certain other real 
property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) 
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, 
California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of 
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 
& 23. 
13. The above-mentioned California properties shall be 
sold as soon as possible. 
14. The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain 
the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to 
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels 
through the date of sale of said properties. 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
16. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice,of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (3 0) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
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right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
17. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2 002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
18. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
19. The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms 
located at the California properties, namely plates, platters, 
clocks, and lamps^ The ski pole in the possession of the 
petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent 
is awarded the ski pole. Petitioner is permitted to make a model 
of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to 
the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place 
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner. 
20. The remainder of the personal property is awarded 
to the parties as currently divided. 
21. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
22. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
23. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5^-of- the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
24. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
25. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
26. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
27. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above. 
Life Insurance 
28. The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. 
Attorney's Fees 
29. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent is ordered to 
assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred herein. The petitioner is ordered to assume cind pay his 
own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
30. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other party any documents required to implement or support the 
provisions of this Decree. 
MADE AND ENTERED this K_2' day of November, 20 02. 
BY THE COURT: 
*
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HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
jiiD¥^AwN MARKING 
At to, for Respondent 
a 38-BaylesW div decree 
Michael D. Murphy (#5115) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
13 North Main 
P.O. Box 15 
Kaysville, Utah 84 03 7 
(801) 547-9274 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY 6. BAYLES, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ).' Civil No. 004702059 
) 
Respondent. ) Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court 
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District 
Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner was present and represented 
by his attorney, Michael D. Murphy, and the Respondent was 
present ~and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking. The 
Court, atter hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed 
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters on July 5, 2006 the following Findings of 
Fact:andlConclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the issues in this case is whether 
or not Petitioner should continue to pay alimony to the 
Respondent and what, if any, money that Petitioner has paid 
Respondent since June of 2004 should be paid back. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law 
2. The Court finds that the second issue the Court is 
considering is who should pay for the survivor benefits and if 
Respondent should reimburse the Petitioner for the survivor 
benefits that he paid since the filing of the Petition to Modify 
on June, 2 004. 
3. The third issue is the parcels of property and whether 
or not the Respondent should strictly comply with the terms and 
conditions which accompanied the various post divorce sales of 
the various parcels of property. 
4. The fourth issue is what should be done with the 
remaining unsold five-acre parcel. 
5. The fifth issue is who should be ordered to pay attorney 
fees in this matter. 
6. The sixth issue is who should be responsible for 
transportation costs and costs of trial. 
7. The remaining issue of whether or not Petitioner should 
continue to maintain the Respondent as a beneficiary on his life 
-Insurance-policy has been stipulated and the parties stipulate 
that Petitioner should no longer be obligated to carry Respondent 
as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy. 
8. In regards to alimony, the Court finds that Petitioner 
was, at the time of October 2002, emplovpd full time at the 
Internal Revenue Service. Petitioner had not had his disability 
rating from IRS prior to the trial and was earning almost twice 
per month at the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Rsv l fc v Rsv1f»c 
Divorce than he is earning now. The Court further finds that 
Petitioner filed the Petition to Modify in June of 2004 and that 
he was current in his monthly alimony through May of 2005. The 
Court further finds that from May of 2 005, Respondent has been 
able to hold her own. 
9. The Court finds that Petitioner no longer has the 
ability to pay alimony. Petitioner is disabled and alimony 
should terminate. The Court finds that the parties' incomes are 
substantially similar and there is no way that alimony can be 
justified. Even if the Respondent needs alimony, Petitioner 
cannot pay alimony. 
10. The Court finds that $12,000 of alimony has been paid 
from the time of the motion to modify in June of 2 004 through May 
of 2005. The Court finds that what alimony has been paid has been 
paid. The Court further finds that it is not appropriate under 
the circumstances of this case to order that the alimony that was 
paid has to be repaid. Both parties shall go forward with no 
on-going- -al-imonyv or with no alimony to be refunded or no 
alimony due. 
11. In regard to the survivor benefits, the Court finds 
that the cost of the survivor benefits is approximately $272.00 
per month and the issue is who should pay for those survivor 
benefits. Respondent already pays a proportion of the cost of 
the Survivor Benefit by virtue of a proportional reduction of her 
Woodward share of the retirement benefit. Respondent will benefit 
by those survivor benefits. She currently receives $599.00 per 
month and that amount will be increased annually pursuant to cost 
of living increases. If Petitioner dies prior to the Respondent, 
Respondent's survivor benefits would triple. The Court sees 
arguments of the parties both ways in determining who should be 
obligated to pay for the survivor benefits and finds an argument 
can be made for splitting it down the middle. The Court finds 
that the survivor benefit has been chosen and has to continue and 
that Petitioner should be ordered to pay for it just as it has 
been in the past. Respondent will have no obligation to pay any 
back survivor benefit payments. Respondent currently receives 
$599.00 per month as her Woodward share of the retirement and 
that amount will be increased annually pursuant to annual cost of 
living increases. 
12. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as 
they currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel 
of property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, 
subject to any debt thereon. Petitioner will have full authority 
-to-sel-1—the—five -acre parcel and receive all monies from that 
sale. The Court finds that if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the 
cost of the five acre parcel gets roughly close to what it would 
cost him to pay for the survivor benefit. The Court finds that 
is fair. The Court further finds that everybody agrees that 
there may be a title problem on this five acres and that 
Petitioner may get less than what he's going to have to pay over 
the time, but finds that's the best the Court can do. It is 
equitable to give Respondent survivor benefit, but appropriate to 
give Petitioner a source of funds with which to pay the survivor 
benefit. 
13. In regards as to whether Respondent should comply with 
all terms of the sales for the various parcels of properties 
since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court finds that 
the position of Petitioner is that Respondent accepted offers 
that included terms of a grant deed, title insurance, and other 
items, and that these were bona fide offers. 
The Court finds that things like title insurance and things 
like these other issues, normally in a closing on a sale, all 
these things are deducted, including real estate commissions or 
whatever they are, as closing costs. The Court further finds 
that's what would have happened if the closing of these sales 
contracts would have been sent to a third party. 
The Court finds that if Petitioner wished to have Respondent 
comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner 
should have done them prior to the time he sent payment. 
The-Court finds Petitioner can argue that Respondent should 
have been put on notice of the terms of the contracts because 
they were in the contracts. 
The Court finds that Respondent had not complied with the 
terms of the sales contracts, but that Petitioner did not demand 
compliance with the terms of the sales contracts until after 
payment had been made. 
The Court further finds the terms of the sales contracts 
were more of a technicality than what the bargain was. 
Thus the Court is not going to order that Respondent is 
going to have to comply with any of the terms of the sales 
contracts. Consequently, Respondent shall not be held in 
contempt for not complying any of the terms contained in the 
sales contracts of the various parcels of real property. 
Respondent was not put on notice to perform all the terms of 
the contracts before the checks for payment were sent; therefore, 
the Court will not order additional performance other than 
requiring Respondent to provide Petitioner with a grant deed on 
property held by the parties by a grant deed and with a quit 
claim deed on properties held by the parties on a quit claim 
deed. 
As co-owner of the property by quit claim deed, Petitioner 
cannot complain of not getting a warranty deed from Respondent. 
Petitioner should not get better title than he had before; he 
takes the property like it was when he had it prior to adding 
Respondent to the title. Respondent's only obligation is to 
-pxovide Petitioner with the deed. 
14. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees. 
15. The court further finds that each party shall pay for 
their own costs and expenses. Petitioner's attorney shall 
reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, $120.00. This $120.00 is 
the cost that Respondent incurred for Petitioner's attorney 
making a motion for continuing the June 2006 trial based upon the 
death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt. 
16. The Court finds that in regards to Petitioner obtaining 
title to the various properties, Respondent shall convey to 
Petitioner titles to the various properties as follows: If the 
parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a grant deed, 
then Petitioner shall receive a grant deed from Respondent. If 
the parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a quit 
claim deed, then Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from 
Respondent. Respondent shall have three months from the date of 
this ruling, July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the 
unconveyed titles of property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1, The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's 
Findings of Fact, that the Petitioner is entitled to an Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry 
herein. 
2. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute 
have been resolved with the Court pursuant to the above Findings 
of Fact. 
SIGNED and DATED this \ W^day of / A V ^ ^ X , 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, this 1^ day of ^ f j/( >,W^ , 2007, 
to: 
Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Secretary 
Michael D. Murphy (#5115) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
13 North Main 
P.O. Box 15 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(801) 547-9274 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, ) ORDER MODIFYING 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner ) 
vs. ) 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ) Civil No. 004702059 
Respondent. ) Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court 
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District 
Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner was present and represented 
by his attorney, Michael D. Murphy, and the Respondent was 
present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking. The 
Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed 
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having previously entered on July 5, 2006 its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following 
Order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Pursuant; to the parties' stipulation, the Petitioner 
shall no longer be obligated to carry Respondent as a beneficiary 
on his life insurance policy. 
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2. Pursuant to the Court's findings that Petitioner no 
longer has the ability to pay alimony, petitioner is disabled, 
and the parties' incomes are substantially similar and there is 
no way alimony can be justified. Even if the Respondent needs 
alimony, Petitioner cannot pay alimony, and the Court orders that 
alimony shall terminate. 
3. The $12,000 in alimony payments made since 2004 shall 
not be refunded. What alimony has been paid has been paid and 
the alimony that was paid shall not be repaid. Both parties 
shall go forward with no on-going alimony, or with no alimony to 
be refunded or with no alimony due. 
4. The survivor retirement benefits shall continue to be 
paid as they have been and Petitioner shall continue to pay for 
it just as it has been in the past. Respondent shall have no 
obligation to pay any back survivor benefit payments. 
5. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as they 
currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel of 
property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, subject 
to any debt thereon. Petitioner shall have full authority to 
sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that sale. 
6. Respondent shall not have to comply with any of the 
terms of the sales contracts other than Respondent shall provide 
Petitioner with a grant deed on property held by the parties by a 
grant deed and with a quit claim deed on properties held by the 
parties on a quit claim deed. Respondent shall not be held in 
contempt for not complying with all the terms contained in the 
sale of the various parcels of real property. 
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7. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees. 
8. Each party shall pay for their own costs and expenses. 
Petitioner's attorney shall reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, 
$120.00. This $120.00 is the cost that Respondent incurred for 
Petitioner's attorney making a motion for continuing the June 
2006 trial based upon the death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt. 
9. Respondent shall convey to the Petitioner titles to the 
various properties as follows: If the parties acquired title to 
a parcel of property by a grant deed, then Petitioner shall 
receive a grant deed from Respondent. If the parties acquired 
title to a parcel of property by a quit claim deed, then 
Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from Respondent. 
Respondent shall have three months from the date of this ruling, 
July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the unconveyed 
titled of property. 
SIGNED and DATED this day of 
lAUv/i\ , 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Modifying Decree, postage prepaid, this ^_ 
d aY of. 1 \/l)('k ^ / 2007, to: 
Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Secretary 
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